In concrete terms, this document analysed the causal impact of administrative extensions on employment growth using natural experience resulting from the immediate suspension of extensions by the government, which took office in Portugal in June 2011. Our analysis uses an RDD that exploits the administrative delay in granting extensions in combination with their suspension in June 2011 and the new consistent data from the employer-employee agreement panel. It is important that this suspension resulted in a significant and unexpected decrease in the likelihood that an extension would have occurred with respect to the date of publication of the underlying collective agreement several months before the change of government. Given the limited number of collective agreements each week, a formal test on the continuity of the density of agreements around the threshold would not be instructive. The rest of this document is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the economic and institutional context at the time of the experiment. Section 3 describes the experience, explains how it is used using a DDR, and explains the validity of this approach in this context. In Section 4, our coordinated employer-employee dataset is supplemented with information on collective agreements and renewals (including their schedule). Section 5 presents evidence of the impact of the extension of management in all areas and, separately, for companies affiliated with an employer organization and companies that are not and are at the occupational level. It also analyses how the impact of enlargements depends on the degree of representativeness of employers` organisations and the role of retroactivity linked to administrative delay in the treatment of enlargements. Section 6 presents some additional results with respect to wage inequality. Finally, Section 7 is concluded. The dataset used for empirical analysis consists of 36 collective agreements signed between October 2010 and August 2011 (see appendix for more details).
Together, they account for about 20% of the private sector workforce. In the empirical analysis, we focus primarily on the 31 agreements signed between October 8, 2010 and June 20, 2011. The limitation of the scope of the agreements signed before 20 June 2011 is explained by the fact that the renewal procedure was suspended with the new government taking office on 21 June 2011. Although this decision has not been published and probably has not had a significant impact on collective bargaining in the coming weeks, we believe it makes more sense to limit ourselves to agreements signed before the signing of the new government12 due to the small number of members of the social partners (particularly trade unions), extensions have played a key role in supporting high and stable tariff security in Portugal and have effectively eliminated the margin competition for low-wage earners. between related and unrelated companies in each sector. Given the high unemployment rate and the need to restore international competitiveness, extensions were increasingly seen as a source of wage rigidity, particularly in smaller, younger and generally less productive enterprises, which were generally unaffiliated and unsa term in collective bargaining.